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CASES NOTED
PLEADING - EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN CONSTRUCTION
OF COMMON LAW DECLARATION
Plaintiff's hair and scalp were injured as a result of the application of
lacquer thereto, on occasions over a period of three years, by defendant,
operator of a beauty parlor. Plaintiff's amended declaration alleged ". . . the
defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence ought
to have known, that the said lacquer would, if allowed to come into contact
with the scalp have a harniful and injurious effect thereon and would thereby
injure and harm the hair by reason of its effect upon the scalp." 1)efendant's
demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the trial court, and this action
was affirmed on appeal on the ground that the allegation did not positively
aver that the lacquer would have a harmful and injurious effect if allowed to
come into contact with the scalp, and such ultimate fact cannot be considered
alleged merely because of intendment. Plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing
which was granted. Held, on rehearing, judgment reversed for further pro-
ceedings, since the declaration set forth a sufficient cause of action.' Collins
v. Selighnan & Lats- of Jacksonville, Inc., 38 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1948).
The Florida Statutes provide that either party may object by demurrer
to the pleading of the op)osite party on the ground that such pleading does not
set forth a sufficient cause of action,2 The sufficiency of a declaration depends
on whether or not it alleges distinctly and with clearness and definiteness every
fact essential to a right of action.3 If the averment is one of ultimate fact,
such fact mnst le set tip by definite and positive allegation, 4 or by fair in-
ference from a direct allegation.5
In order to prove that the defendant was negligent in that he knew or
should have known that the lacquer would cause injury, it must first be shown
that the lacquer, as a matter of fact, is injurious. One cannot be held to know
of the existence of a fact without a showing that the fact exists. That the
lacquer is injurious is then an ultimate fact.6 In order for the plaintiff to
1. "The declaration is not exactly according to Andrew Stephen's Principles of
Pleading. It could be more exact and positive in its averments, however there is room
for difference of opinion relative to its sufficiency and we will not hold it fatally bad and
visit the harsh result upon the plaintiff." Id. at 133.
2. FLA. STAT. § 50.24 (1941) (derived from the English Common Law Procedure
Act of 1861).
3. Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352. 154 So. 134 (1934); Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Rentz, 60 Fla. 429, 54 So. 13 (1910) ; Kirton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 57 Fla. 79,
49 So. 1024 (1909).
4. Gus' Baths, Inc. v: Lightbown, 118 Fla. 813, 160 So. 370 (1935) ; Ballas v. Lake
Weir Light and Water Co., 100 Fla. 913, 130 So. 421 (1930) ; Chase & Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 94 Fla. 922, 115 So. 185 (1927).
5. Williams v. Pringle, 61 Fla. 485, 54 So. 452 (1911) ; see Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States v. MeKeithan, 119 Fla. 486, 488, 160 So. 883, 884 (1935).
6. See Gerue v. Medford Bridge Co., 205 Wis. 68. 236 N.\ , 528, 529 (1931).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
profit by the proof of this fact, it must first be alleged in the pleadings. 7 The
allegations and the proof twust be consistent. Only the issues raised by the
pleadings can be proved, and there can be no recovery upon a cause of action,
no matter how worthy. where the proof varies in substance from that which
is pleaded by the plaintiff.
To infer the absent fact "necessarily or fairly" from this plaintiff's declara-
tion required an extremely liberal interpretation by the court. There is ob-
viously some doubt as to whether the dangerous effect of the lacquer as a
matter of fact, in and of itself, need be alleged. The court admitted that the
declaration tinder consideration was not exact and positive in its averments. 9
Considering the well-established principle that in case of doubt, ambiguity or
uncertainty, the cpnstruction of a pleading will be adopted which is most un-
favorable to the pleader,' o it seems that, in construing this declaration most
strongly against the plaintiff, the opposite result should have been reached.
The court's apparent application of equitable principles to the construction
of a pleading at law, in a state in which the courts of law and equity are
separate, is a deviation which, if extended, will impair the utility of the de-
murrer to a faulty declaration.
TAXATION-CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS-GIFT OR INCOME
Respondent. holder of a 99-year lease on real property, borrowed $90,000
from a bank, executing in return bonds secured by a trust deed mortgaging
to the bank the leasehold. The trustee bank closed and a bondholders' corn-
mittee was formed. Respondent subsequently purchased the bonds for an
amount less than their face value. Purchases were effected b (I ) direct
negotiation with individual bondholders; (2) indirect negotiation through
brokers and the bondholders' committee. Respondent was solvent both before
and after the acquisition of the bonds. Each seller of bonds knew that lie was
selling to respondent-maker and at a price less than the face value. Respondent
failed to include in his gross income for federal income tax purposes the differ-
ence between the purchase prices paid by hin and the face value. The Coninis-
7. Pensacola Electric Terminal Ry. v. Haussnia,, 51 Fla. 286, 40 So. 196 (1906)
Jacksonville T. & K. W. Ry. v. Neff, 28 Fla. 373, 9 So. 653 (1891) (instructions of the
court must be confined to the issues made by the pleading).
8. Florida Fire & Casualty Ins. Co, v. Hart, 73 Fla. 970, 75 So. 528 (1917) ; ee
Hollingsworth v. Norris, 77 Fla. 498, 0, 81 So. 782, 783 (1919) ; Ingram-Dekle Lumber
Co. v. Geiger, 71 Fla. 390, 418, 71 So. 552, 560 (1916). It appears, however, that the de-
fect of variance between pleading and proof will usually be cured by a verdict. FLA.
STAT. § 54.26 (1941).
9. See note 1 suprn.
10. Nev-Cal Electric Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 85 F.2d 886 (C.C.A. 5th
1936) ; State ex rel. Dillman v. Tedder, Judge, 123 Fla. 188, 166 So. 590 (1936); see
Hernandez v. Pensacola, 141 Fla. 441, 445, 193 So. 555, 557 (1940) ; Woodcock v. Wilcox,
98 Fla. 14, 18, 122 So. 789, 790 (1929).
